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Legal Ethics Is About the Law, Not Morality or 
Justice: A Reply to Critics 
W. Bradley Wendel* 
In Martin Scorsese’s concert film Shine A Light, guitarist Jack White 
joins the Rolling Stones on stage for one song.1  As he is playing and singing, 
he keeps stealing glances at Mick Jagger and is unable to stop grinning like 
an idiot.  It is obvious to any viewer what he is thinking in that moment: 
“Holy s---, I’m playing with the Rolling Stones!”  I know exactly how he 
feels, since the legal ethics equivalent of the Rolling Stones have been 
gracious enough to invite me onto the stage with them.  Like Jack White 
growing up listening to Keith Richards, I have been reading and learning 
from the scholars in this Colloquy for as long as I can remember—maybe 
copping a few licks while trying to find my own distinctive sound, but 
always conscious of the pioneering work of my predecessors.  Not only do I 
admire the work of my reviewers enormously, but I am deeply grateful for 
the sympathetic mindset with which they approached the book.  Reading 
through the reviews, I frequently found myself saying, “Yes, that’s exactly 
the point.”  Engaged critics make disagreement an even more urgent matter 
for an author, as there is no way to write off such criticism as the result of 
misunderstanding or as attacking a straw version of the position in the book.  
As a result, I fear that I have not done justice to all of the points raised in 
these reviews.  In some instances, the book has to speak for itself.2  In other 
cases, a satisfactory response to a challenging point raised in one of these 
reviews would require a separate essay, well beyond the space constraints of 
this brief response.  I am hopeful that the reviews are only the beginning of a 
debate about the book, because I have a lot more to say! 
I. Indeterminacy 
All of the reviewers express, in one form or another, the concern that 
law cannot perform the function assigned to it in my theory.  They accurately 
summarize the argument that the law supersedes societal controversy and 
provides a moderately stable, provisional framework for cooperation, 
 
 * Professor of Law, Cornell University. 
1. SHINE A LIGHT (Paramount Classics 2008). 
2. For example, Pepper and Simon object strongly to my take on the case of Daniel Bibb, the 
prosecutor in the Manhattan District Attorney’s office who allegedly contrived with defense lawyers 
to scuttle the retrial of two defendants whom Bibb believed were innocent.  Stephen L. Pepper, The 
Lawyer Knows More than the Law, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 691 , 696 (2012) (book review); William H. 
Simon, Authoritarian Legal Ethics: Bradley Wendel and the Positivist Turn, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 709, 
711–12 (2012) (book review).  Maybe readers will remain unpersuaded, but I really do not think I 
can improve on the arguments in the book. 
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notwithstanding normative and empirical disagreement.  They worry, 
however, that the law is incapable of settling society-wide disagreement.  If it 
is not, there would seem to be little reason to respect it.  Kruse puts the 
objection quite clearly and powerfully: “If law lacks the capacity to settle 
deep and persistent normative controversy in society, then Wendel’s func-
tional argument for the legitimacy of law falls away.”3  The problem is not 
that the process is random, like consulting a Magic 8-Ball, but that the law 
merely reproduces social disagreement in the guise of legal interpretation.  
Pepper appeals to what H.L.A. Hart refers to as the open texture of law.4  
Hart notes that subsuming specific facts under instances of a general rule 
calls for the exercise of judgment, and no rule can determine its own appli-
cation in advance.5  The law may also embody awkward compromises, have 
more than one purpose, or be such a hodgepodge that it is essentially 
purposeless.6  Kruse makes a similar point when she says, “[I]t is 
questionable that law has the capacity to settle moral controversy.”7  Simon’s 
objection is different.  He does not so much assert the indeterminacy of law 
as rely on its determinacy and claim that I have gotten the legal analysis 
wrong because I assume a formalistic style of legal reasoning.8 
 
3. Katherine R. Kruse, Fidelity to Law and the Moral Pluralism Premise, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 
657, 663 (2012) (book review). 
4. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 127–28 (2d ed. 1994) (“Whichever device, 
precedent or legislation, is chosen for the communication of standards of behaviour, these, however 
smoothly they work over the great mass of ordinary cases, will, at some point where their 
application is in question, prove indeterminate; they will have what has been termed an open 
texture.”). 
5. See id. at 130 (“We shall thus indeed succeed in settling in advance, but also in the dark, 
issues which can only reasonably be settled when they arise and are identified.”).  Pepper’s criticism 
is clearly indebted to Hart: 
As enacted, a legal provision is a generality . . . .  The lawyer, however, is present at a 
specific potential application of that legal provision. . . .  A legal provision’s moral or 
policy compromise is up in the air, general, and abstract; lawyer and client are down on 
the ground where the law’s effect will be concrete and specific. 
Pepper, supra note 2, at 693. 
6. See, e.g., Pepper, supra note 2, at 693 (arguing that laws are enacted as general rules of 
thumb to achieve certain moral or policy purposes but that their real-world application is often more 
nuanced or complex). 
7. Kruse, supra note 3, at 658. 
8. Simon relies on Dworkin’s argument in Model of Rules I that positivism cannot account for 
the role that principles play in legal reasoning.  See Simon, supra note 2, at 712–13 (“Dworkin, in 
rejecting the positivist ‘Model of Rules,’ insisted that the role of principles and policies in the legal 
system precluded any strong separation.”); RONALD DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I, in TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14 (1978).  Dworkin’s critique of positivism is that it features an implausible 
model of adjudication, in which a judge’s decision is either determined by applicable rules or left to 
the standardless exercise of discretion.  DWORKIN, supra, at 34–35.  What we call legal judgment, 
according to Dworkin, is better understood as the balancing of rules against principles of political 
morality; these principles do not dictate results but “incline a decision one way, though not 
conclusively.”  Id. at 35.  In places, however, Simon ascribes to Dworkin an implausible view about 
the scope of principles.  For example, he says that impeaching a witness known to be telling the 
truth by introducing evidence of the witness’s prior criminal conviction would violate the principle 
that parties should not mislead the trier of fact.  Simon, supra note 2, at 713.  Not only does this 
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Despite differences in detail, the critics’ objections come down to this: 
The law does not provide some fixed point of reference but can be adapted 
by clever lawyers to their clients’ needs.  Rather than replacing client 
interests with legal entitlements, lawyers just obscure the rent-seeking 
process with a rhetorical façade.  In the book, I quoted King Louis XII of 
France, who supposedly complained that “[l]awyers use the law as 
shoemakers use leather; rubbing it, pressing it, stretching it with their teeth, 
all to the end of making it fit their purposes.”9  If lawyers really do have this 
power of pressing the law into whatever shape best fits their clients’ 
purposes, the law cannot provide a framework for social cooperation that 
transcends disagreement.  Not surprisingly, I do not accept the shoe-leather 
criticism, as stated by King Louis or by my critics here.  The problem in a 
short response like this one is to demonstrate how law can be relatively stable 
and determinate.  Since I cannot reargue the book in a few pages, I will only 
suggest that legal scholars should pay more attention to what lawyers 
actually do, as opposed to arguing about abstractions. 
For example, I have written extensively about the legal advice given 
during the Bush Administration Department of Justice (DOJ) lawyers who 
concluded that domestic and international law prohibiting torture did not 
prohibit interrogation techniques amounting to torture, when performed by 
American interrogators as part of the so-called war on terror.10  My response 
was that the lawyers had failed in ethical terms as lawyers, not because tor-
ture is terrible in ordinary moral terms (although it is), but because the legal 
advice given reflects an attitude of contempt, or at least indifference, toward 
the law.  Recently, it has been reported that DOJ lawyers in the Obama 
Administration have prepared a still-secret memo authorizing the President to 
kill American citizens abroad without a trial, as long as the President certifies 
that they were taking part in hostilities between al Qaeda and the United 
 
reasoning elide the client’s legal entitlement to put the state to its proof, but it relies on a principle 
that is too abstractly stated.  Legal principles are different from moral principles in that they gain 
content and force only as instantiated as legal reasons.  In the impeachment example, the principle 
that one should not mislead the trier of fact is instantiated in fairly specific rules with clearly 
defined triggering conditions and exceptions.  The clearest illustration is the prohibition on 
presenting false evidence, including the testimony of clients and nonclient witnesses.  MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a) (2009).  The prohibition applies only when the lawyer knows 
the evidence to be introduced is false, with knowledge defined as “actual knowledge.”  Id.  R. 1.0(f), 
R. 3.3 cmt. 8.  Moreover, the lawyer should first attempt to dissuade the client from committing 
perjury, and if that fails she should seek the guidance of the court, which may order the lawyer to 
proceed with normal questioning of the witness or may permit the lawyer to put on the testimony in 
a narrative format.  Id. R. 3.3 cmt. 7.  I am not denying the existence of principles or their role in 
legal reasoning, but it is important that lawyers rely on reasons internal to the law, not free-floating 
moral ideals that, whatever their attractiveness, are not part of the law. 
9. W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW 69 (2010). 
10. See generally W. Bradley Wendel, Executive Branch Lawyers in a Time of Terror: The 
2008 F.W. Wickwire Memorial Lecture, 31 DALHOUSIE L.J. 247 (2008); W. Bradley Wendel, Legal 
Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 67 (2005); W. Bradley Wendel, 
The Torture Memos and the Demands of Legality, 12 LEGAL ETHICS 107 (2009) (book review).  
The torture memos are discussed in the book in Section 6.1.  WENDEL, supra note 9, at 177–84. 
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States and it is impossible or impracticable to capture them alive.11  The 
government relied on that advice to authorize the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki 
and his sixteen-year-old son.  One of three things must be true about these 
recent killings and the legal advice given to the President: (1) the legal advice 
is a sound, faithful interpretation of governing law, and the Obama DOJ 
lawyers acted ethically while those in the Bush DOJ did not; (2) the legal 
advice is just as unsound as that contained in the torture memos prepared by 
the DOJ in the Bush administration and should be criticized in the same 
terms; or (3) there is no way to praise or blame either group of lawyers 
because the law is like shoe leather and can be formed into whatever shape is 
needed to satisfy the client’s wishes.  The legal analysis authorizing the 
killing of al-Awlaki and his son is still secret, so it has not been subjected to 
the extensive, critical scrutiny given to the Bush-era torture memos, but when 
the Obama administration memos finally surface, as they undoubtedly will, I 
expect conscientious lawyers who are experts in the relevant fields of law to 
debate whether the legal analysis is sound.  For academic critics to assert the 
indeterminacy of law is essentially to abandon the ideal of legality and the 
norms of the very craft we purport to teach to our students.  Strong 
indeterminacy claims have always struck me more as rhetorical posturing 
than serious jurisprudential arguments, although there are some sophisticated 
sociolegal accounts of the way clients actually experience and comply with 
law that deserve serious attention.12  The only way to really refute an 
indeterminacy argument, however, is to get inside the practice of making and 
evaluating legal arguments. 
II. Exclusion of Morality 
Simon is correct to note that I distinguish my position from his, as well 
as from those of Luban and Deborah Rhode, in not seeing justice as the 
central normative touchstone for legal ethics.13  If the role of the lawyer is 
not to be understood in terms of justice, then what social good could it serve?  
Critics like Luban, who accuse the book of adopting a Panglossian stance on 
the legal system,14 are conflating my argument about the lawyer’s role with a 
 
11. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world/middleeast/secret-us-
memo-made-legal-case-to-kill-a-citizen.html (reporting on the killing of Anwar al-Awlaki by a 
drone-fired missile in Yemen); Glenn Greenwald, The Killing of Awlaki’s 16-Year-Old Son, SALON 
(Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.salon.com/2011/10/20/the_killing_of_awlakis_16_year_old_son/
singleton (“The Executive Branch decided it has the authority to target U.S. citizens for death . . . .  
It then concluded in a secret legal memo that Awlaki specifically could be killed, but refuses to 
disclose what it ruled or in which principles this ruling was grounded.”). 
12. I discuss Kruse’s critique of this argument in Part III.  See infra notes 34–43 and 
accompanying text. 
13. Simon, supra note 2, at 710. 
14. Part III of Luban’s review is entitled “The Best of All Possible Legal Systems,” an allusion 
to Voltaire’s Dr. Pangloss who, in turn, was a satire of Leibniz’s purported solution to the problem 
of evil.  David Luban, Misplaced Fidelity, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 673, 679 (2012) (book review). 
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more general argument about the social value of the law.  To be sure, the 
position I take on the lawyer’s role depends on the social value of the law, 
but it is limited in an important way: The task of legal ethics is to understand 
what constitutes right and wrong conduct by lawyers.  Right conduct may be, 
as I argue, exhibiting respect for the law in advising one’s clients and in 
representing clients in litigation, and the reason this is right for lawyers may 
relate to the social goods sought to be secured by the law.  This does not 
mean, however, that one can always conclude that the law represents a posi-
tive good for a particular client in a particular case.  Luban rightly 
characterizes the problem of overcrowded prisons and conditions of 
confinement that may constitute torture as a matter of international law.15  It 
truly would be the height of smug complacency to address the prisoners in 
one of these torture-chamber prisons and tell them they should be grateful for 
the goods secured by the law.16  That stance would have the quality of bad 
theodicy, which confidently informs people that they should thank God for 
their suffering because God undoubtedly intends to use that suffering for 
good elsewhere in the world.17  But my argument is not that the law is always 
good for all people; rather, it is that if there is good to be found in law, the 
legal system, and the legal profession, it should be understood in a particular 
way.  It is good that people have available to them a way of organizing 
society that manifests respect for one another as equals.  This is not all there 
is to life, however, and it certainly should not be understood as crowding out 
other means of social interaction, problem solving, moral deliberation, and 
self-understanding.18 
 
15. Id. at 681. 
16. Id. 
17. See, e.g., BART D. EHRMAN, GOD’S PROBLEM: HOW THE BIBLE FAILS TO ANSWER OUR 
MOST IMPORTANT QUESTION—WHY WE SUFFER 8 (2008) (discussing various philosophical 
approaches to the problem of theodicy). 
18. In an extremely interesting section of his review, Luban unpacks the word fidelity and 
charges me, in effect, with making a category mistake.  Luban, supra note 14, at 681–86.  
Allegations of marital infidelity do not mean merely violating some abstract norm of devotion or 
loyalty; rather, they signify specifically going over to a rival, a transfer of allegiance, switching 
sides.  Id. at 681–82.  Betrayal of a friendship likewise means abandoning a person, either in favor 
of another or in favor of oneself.  Id. at 682–83.  Similarly, religious fidelity means refraining from 
idolatry or the worship of other gods.  Id. at 683–84.  In all of these cases, fidelity is something 
owed to another with whom one is in a direct personal relationship, unmediated by abstract duties or 
relationships constituted through institutions.  Id. at 684–85.  Luban and I are in complete 
agreement that the obligation, if any, to respect the law must derive from respect for the people in 
one’s political community, and that disobedience (or, I might add, working around the law) is a 
form of free riding that expresses disdain for one’s fellow citizens.  Id.  Because fidelity is a value 
associated with intimate relationships, however, fidelity-related duties are necessarily reciprocal, 
and a lack of faithfulness by one party can “snap[] the bonds of reciprocity.”  Id. at 685.  When a 
person or group within a political community is abandoned or subjected to discrimination by the 
majority, it would be cruel to call upon these marginalized citizens to express fidelity to the law, 
because “the law”—in personal terms, the majority of members of the political community—has 
already been unfaithful.  Id.  It would be tantamount to forcing a betrayed spouse to remain in a 
marriage while the other spouse continues cheating.  Luban thus inverts the image of faithfulness, 
constancy, and loyalty that I meant to invoke in the title of the book, turning it into a powerful 
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As Luban notes, however, the entire structure may be a bit fiddly if any 
morality is allowed to creep back into deliberation.  The process through 
which people are able to transcend uncertainty and disagreement, by 
replacing first-order reasons for action with the second-order reasons given 
by the law, may unwind if lawyers frequently resort back to first-order 
reasons.19  This “resorting back” would occur if second-order reasons are not 
truly exclusionary but are only presumptive or weighty.  Luban has relied on 
the idea of recourse roles,20 under which, in some cases, the best way to 
remain faithful to the requirements of a role is to violate them.  A role is 
constituted for some end or ends.  In the great majority of cases, the way 
someone acting in a role will best accomplish those ends is to follow the 
directives of the role.  There may be instances, however, in which the best 
way to achieve the ends of a role is to do something that is not permitted by 
the constitutive rules of the role.  In order to make this determination, the 
occupant of a role must have recourse back to the ends of the role (hence the 
name recourse role).21  Recourse roles nicely capture the role-differentiated 
nature of obligations faced by many professionals without losing touch 
entirely with the broader social ends for which the professional role is 
constituted.  As I have noted in a paper published after the book, recourse 
roles do not necessarily license wide-open moral deliberation; “rather, an 
agent has recourse only to certain considerations, such as the specific task the 
role is designed to accomplish.”22  It is actually Simon, not Luban, who 
should rely on the idea of recourse roles, because Simon’s overall 
argumentative strategy is to juxtapose what many would agree is the end of 
the lawyer’s role (legal justice) with the injustices that frequently result in 
particular cases.  It seems less plausible to think that the end of the lawyer’s 
role is to do good in ordinary moral terms, although some philosophers have 
argued that law has authority only to the extent that it improves compliance 
with morality.23  In my view, which I think is shared by most practitioners, 
 
critique of injustice—“difference made legal” in the words of Martin Luther King Jr.  Id. at 684–85.  
It is the case that I had interpretive fidelity in mind when I thought of the title of the book, but the 
dual meaning of the word does underscore the importance of fairness and reciprocity as the 
foundation of the obligation to respect the law.  See id. at 685–86 (agreeing that interpretive fidelity 
can be an obligation of lawyers). 
19. Luban, supra note 14, at 687 (“Wendel’s seemingly minor modification actually 
undermines the basic Razian architecture of separating multiple levels of reasons.”). 
20. See MORTIMER R. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY: A STUDY OF 
LAWFUL DEPARTURES FROM LEGAL RULES 15–36 (1973) (“[I]t is precisely to the concept of their 
[social] role that people turn when they want to understand what they can and cannot do.”).  As 
Luban notes in his review, he relied on the structure of recourse roles in his reformulation of the 
position in Lawyers and Justice.  See Luban, supra note 14, at 687 n.69 (citing David Luban, 
Freedom and Constraint in Legal Ethics: Some Mid-course Corrections to Lawyers and Justice, 49 
MD. L. REV. 424 (1990)). 
21. KADISH & KADISH, supra note 20, at 21–22. 
22. W. Bradley Wendel, Three Concepts of Roles, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 547, 553 (2011). 
23. See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, 
RULES, AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 98–99 (2001) (observing that the most important element of 
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lawyers are not all-purpose agents who facilitate moral deliberation; rather, 
they are simultaneously representatives of clients and ministers of the law 
who help clients fit their conduct within the scheme of rights and duties 
created by the law. 
Whether the end of the lawyer’s role is taken to be justice or morality, 
recourse roles are vulnerable to the problem of pluralism.  One of the princi-
pal arguments in the book, which none of the reviewers seems to disagree 
with, is that reasonable, conscientious people may disagree in good faith 
about what is required by morality or justice in a particular situation.  As a 
result, there is a missing “who decides?” question embedded in the recourse 
strategy: Suppose a lawyer believes that asserting a client’s legal entitlement, 
either as the basis for legal advice or in litigation, will result in either 
injustice (to use Simon’s conception of the end of the role)24 or an ordinary 
moral violation (Luban’s conception).25  Now suppose the client disagrees 
with the lawyer and insists that the lawyer take the lawful action that would 
vindicate the client’s legal entitlement.  Is it the lawyer’s prerogative to 
decide whether to act directly on the end of the role?  If so, then giving the 
lawyer this decision-making authority undercuts the agency nature of the 
lawyer–client relationship.26  On the other hand, of course, the lawyer must 
worry about her own moral (not legal) agency.  In the vast majority of cases 
in a basically just society, however, a lawyer can assume that she is not 
committing a moral wrong by helping clients order their affairs with respect 
to their legal entitlements.  I do not deny the existence of injustice that 
 
understanding a law is understanding what the moral authority that created the law intended the law 
to mean); Heidi M. Hurd, Interpreting Authorities, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION 405, 425 (Andrei 
Marmor ed., 1995) (arguing that the interpretation of laws must be based upon how well laws 
“conform our conduct to the demands of morality”). 
24. Simon, supra note 2, at 715–17. 
25. Luban, supra note 14, at 676–78. 
26. Pepper worries that an obligation of fidelity to law that is too strict will cause lawyers to 
lose sight of their obligation to serve clients.  Pepper, supra note 2, at 696–97.  His objection 
underscores the fiduciary nature of the attorney–client relationship, as elaborated in countless cases.  
See, e.g., Maritrans GP Inc. v. Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 602 A.2d 1277, 1287–88 (Pa. 1992) 
(enforcing a preliminary injunction against attorneys who breached their fiduciary duty to their 
client).  One reason Fried’s lawyer-as-friend metaphor has had staying power is that it makes this 
relationship of trust and confidence central to the lawyer’s ethical duties.  But a lawyer is not just a 
fiduciary; a lawyer is a fiduciary with respect to the client’s interests and the law.  Lawyers have the 
privilege and the burden of representing their clients’ interests, zealously, within the bounds of the 
law.  A lawyer does not have a simple, straightforward fiduciary relationship with only one party; 
rather, the lawyer and the client are both encumbered by other duties—in this case, respect for the 
law—and those duties affect the way the lawyer must carry out her fiduciary obligations to the 
client.  Cf. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analysis, 1 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 15, 31–32 (1987) (“The client in such a triangular situation is not a person 
alone—the A of classical legal hypotheticals, where ‘A, the owner of Blackacre’ does something to 
or is done something by B.  One who has become another’s guardian is no longer A but has become 
‘A encumbered by duties to B.’”).  Picking up on this analysis, the lawyer in my conception of legal 
ethics is the representative of “the client encumbered by duties to the law” and also has her own 
directly owed duties to respect the law.  The lawyer does not merely assist her client in acting but 
also in meeting the client’s legal obligations while acting. 
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anyone would recognize as such, notwithstanding pervasive moral pluralism.  
Rather than try to design a system of legal ethics around those extreme cases, 
however, I wrote this book to account for the nature of the good that lawyers 
do—most of the time.27 
III. Exclusion of Politics 
Luban, Kruse, Simon, and Alfieri charge me with being, in Luban’s 
words, “[an apologist] for the status quo.”28  Law by itself may not have 
much to offer to impoverished, marginalized communities like West Grove, 
which is served admirably by Alfieri, his colleagues, and their students.29  I 
also would not restrict a community organizer, activist, and lawyer to 
formalistic strategies and wooden obedience to law, and in fact, I would 
wholeheartedly endorse the multifaceted strategy of private fundraising, a 
media campaign, public protests, and political pressure to prevent the closure 
of libraries that are vitally important to the West Grove community.30  As 
Simon rightly observes, “principled defiance of constituted authority is an 
honored tradition in American public life.”31  I share Simon’s admiration of 
courageous men and women who participated in lunch-counter sit-ins and the 
Birmingham march.32  He is correct that sit-ins and the like were illegal at the 
 
27. In the book I quote Larry Alexander and Fred Schauer’s observation that it would be odd to 
focus the study of constitutional law primarily on Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 
(1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; and Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).  WENDEL, supra note 9, at 102–03.  The Supreme Court has, 
from time to time, really stuffed it up.  A lawyer seeking to understand the way courts interpret the 
Constitution would be advised to focus mostly on cases that continue to be debated by the Court as 
expressions of still-viable constitutional doctrine. 
28. Luban, supra note 14, at 680. 
29. Anthony V. Alfieri, Fidelity to Community: A Defense of Community Lawyering, 90 TEXAS 
L. REV. 635, 635–36, 652–56 (2012). 
30. See Alfieri, supra note 29, at 4–5 (“[T]he [Historic Black Church] Program contemplated a 
media campaign (e.g., editorials and letters), public protest (e.g., a march, rally, or sit-in), and 
political pressure (e.g., reporting selected public officials to regulatory agencies for the purposes of 
investigating ongoing unethical or unlawful conduct in unrelated matters), all to persuade local 
municipal and county officials to help mobilize public opposition to the proposed closing.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
31. Simon, supra note 2, at 715.  Critics sometimes say I am making a fetish out of the law and 
legal authority—Simon’s use of the word “authoritarian,” id. at 718, captures the flavor of this sort 
of objection—but it is important to emphasize that the authority of law is, in my view, ultimately 
grounded in the value of equality and the obligation to treat one’s fellow citizens with respect.  
Simon thinks the fear of anarchy keeps me up at night, id. at 709, but the boogeyman in the closet of 
the book is better identified as solipsism and arrogance.  I am gratified to see Simon concede that 
“lawyers are not routinely privileged or obliged to act on their own views on the ultimate merits of 
the controversies in which they are involved.”  Id. at 711.  Perhaps I have been misreading him for 
years, but I have always understood Simon as arguing for precisely the contrary—i.e., that lawyers 
either may or must consider whether the actions they take on behalf of their clients are likely to 
promote justice.  See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ 
ETHICS 138 (1998) (“Lawyers should take those actions that, considering the relevant circumstances 
of the particular case, seem likely to promote justice.”). 
32. Simon, supra note 2, at 715. 
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time, but there is nothing wrong with a lawyer participating in civil 
disobedience, defending clients after the fact against charges of trespassing 
or disorderly conduct, or even advising clients to engage in civil 
disobedience, as long as the lawyer clearly states that the justice of the 
client’s cause does not make the activity lawful.  Conversely, the availability 
of some strategies of resistance based on legality, political legitimacy, and 
legal rights does not preclude the use of nonlegal strategies to accomplish the 
end of social justice.33  The only inference I am concerned with blocking is 
the one drawn from the justice of some outcome to its legality. 
Kruse perceives that I envision the law as the hero in an allegory in 
which society faces trouble in the form of an impasse caused by empirical 
uncertainty or normative pluralism.34  But like my colleague Jim 
Henderson’s feckless superhero Captain Torts,35 the law sometimes either 
fails to rescue people from trouble or manages to make things even worse 
through its intervention.36  Kruse agrees that the law transforms controversy, 
and she acknowledges that this is a good thing, but she denies that the law 
ever really settles anything.  In the debate over same-sex marriage, for 
example, “the language of law continues to provide ways to formulate and 
package the issues in the debate,” using analogies with civil rights claims 
raised by interracial couples to clarify the rights at stake.37  This 
transformation is not complete, however; it is a repackaged moral debate, but 
the terms of the debate are still set by “reason and the public good,” not 
merely by what is lawful.38  The law merely provides additional conceptual 
 
33. Cf. Alfieri, supra note 29, at 33–34 (“In the context of low-income communities of color, 
democratic lawyering offers race- and identity-conscious strategies of advocacy and counseling 
fashioned from dissenting voices traditionally outside law, legality and legitimacy . . . .  [L]awyer 
candor, collaboration, and a race-conscious conversation best steer the normative assessment of 
legal–political strategies . . . and the practical consideration of alternative nonlegal tactics . . . .”). 
34. See Kruse, supra note 3, at 663 (“Wendel’s functional argument in a nutshell is that we 
should respect the law despite our moral disagreement with its content because law does for us 
something that we cannot do for ourselves: law rescues us from moral pluralism.”). 
35. One of my goals as a legal academic is to make better known the story of Captain Torts, one 
of the great unpublished characters in jurisprudence: 
Captain Torts is a fellow about [Henderson’s] size (let us simply say a large person), 
[who] wanders through our society seeking to protect people from the wrongs of 
others.  Captain Torts is dressed in a baggy leotard, with a cape and a large yellow T in 
a circle on his chest.  Whenever he hears of someone in distress, he enters the scene 
(usually, if possible, through a window) and attempts a rescue.  Much of the time, he is 
a welcome addition, and helps to correct imbalances of power between persons in the 
society.  Occasionally, . . . Captain Torts is resented by the people that he tries to help.  
On those occasions, the people try to push him back out the window.  What all of this 
means, Henderson leaves to the reader. 
JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS: TEACHER’S MANUAL 20 (7th ed. 2007). 
36. For an example of an argument that the law sometimes makes societal disagreement worse, 
see John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 
(1973). 
37. Kruse, supra note 3, at 667–68. 
38. Id. at 668. 
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resources, such as notions of rights, duties, and due process, with which to 
conduct this ongoing debate.39  This leads Kruse to a challenging critique of 
my position, namely that the functional and normative arguments to respect 
the law should be recast as argument to respect the legal system.  A legal 
system consists of much more than enacted laws to be followed—including 
multiple avenues for citizen participation in the process of democratic self-
government.  In contrast with my nightmare of intractable disagreement, 
Kruse posits a noble dream of law opening a space within which a plurality 
of moral viewpoints can thrive.40  Society should not aim for settlement 
(even on a provisional basis) of moral controversy, but it should provide 
avenues for peaceful, constructive disagreement to thrive. 
The book does attempt to account for “the complex interplay created 
between private compliance with (or deviance from) law and public 
lawmaking.”41  Drawing from the work of Lauren Edelman and Mark 
Suchman, Section 6.4.2 shows how employers responded to the legal defini-
tion of sexual harassment and the obligations imposed on employers to 
prevent a hostile work environment.42  Kruse is correct that the process of 
complying with antidiscrimination laws is not a simple, linear one of reading 
a law and obeying its clear directive; instead, the meaning of the laws 
emerged through application, as employers tried to figure out how to comply 
with an uncertain, shifting mandate.  Law therefore enables politics rather 
than preempting disagreement.  I do not disagree with this way of putting 
Kruse’s criticism if the relevant actors believe themselves to be attempting in 
good faith to ascertain what the law permits or requires.  Respect for the law 
may include grudging acquiescence as well as open disobedience.43  What is 
 
39. Although controversy continues about same-sex marriage, the law does settle at least some 
issues.  If the clerk of Tompkins County, New York, refuses to issue a marriage license that covers 
a same-sex union (a highly unlikely occurrence given the politics of Ithaca, but it’s a hypothetical), 
then one can criticize the county clerk in terms of the ethics of public office for substituting his or 
her own view about morality for a legal entitlement to receive a marriage license. 
40. Kruse, supra note 3, at 670–71. 
41. Id. at 671. 
42. See WENDEL, supra note 9, at 203–07. 
43. To be clear, I do not intend anything in the book to ground a criticism of community 
lawyers as abusers of the law, as Alfieri fears.  Alfieri notes that “daily combat against inner-city 
poverty and racial inequality requires the creative enlargement of conventional lawyer roles and 
functions as well as the expansion of constitutional, statutory, and common law entitlements.”  
Alfieri, supra note 29, at 649.  I could not agree more.  There is a deep and subtle debate between 
some proponents of critical legal studies on the one hand, and critical race theory on the other, over 
whether legal rights are oppressive or empowering.  Patricia Williams argues, for example, that 
legal rights are a way of insisting that powerful white actors recognize the dignity and power of 
African-Americans.  PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 146–66 (1991).  
For Williams, assertions of rights confront the denial of human needs in a way that requires 
acknowledgement of these needs.  See id. at 153 (“For the historically disempowered, the conferring 
of rights is symbolic of all the denied aspects of their humanity: rights imply a respect that places 
one in the referential range of self and others, that elevates one’s status from human body to social 
being.”).  Although I lack Williams’s eloquence, I have tried to say something similar: progressives 
should not make such a totalizing critique of power imbalances in society that they call into 
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ruled out, however, is covert nullification or manipulation of the law.  There 
is room in my vision of legality for lunch counter sit-ins as well as the back-
and-forth between courts and employers that created the existing law of 
sexual harassment through an iterated process of court challenges and new 
mandates to employers.  Legal settlement is not a one-time event.  Rather, it 
can be a process by which actors in society orient themselves around legal 
rights and duties.  This does not preempt nonlegal ordering, but it does make 
possible a distinctive kind of order in which citizens justify their actions to 
each other with reference to social procedures that reflect shared values of 
equality and dignity. 
IV. Stupid Laws 
It is not surprising that my reviewers have sought to embarrass the 
position in the book by pointing to laws that, as Pepper nicely puts it, have 
results that “may be perverse in relation to generally accepted values or the 
particular values underlying the legal provision.”44  Pepper’s example is a 
prohibition on hiring undocumented workers, which prevents a working 
couple from hiring a child-care provider.45  Simon imagines the 
discriminatory enforcement of an archaic fornication statute that criminalizes 
consensual sex between unmarried adults.46  Although they put the objection 
more kindly, what they are really saying is, “Surely you cannot mean that 
this law is deserving of respect!”  But to quote the late Leslie Nielsen’s 
character in Airplane!, “[I do mean that], and stop calling me Shirley!”47 
In Pepper’s case, the lawyer cannot tell the couple that it is legally 
permissible to hire the undocumented worker.  Pepper envisions the lawyer 
giving categorical and somewhat dismissive advice: “[Y]ou can’t and 
shouldn’t [hire the worker].  It’s unlawful.”48  He is right that the situation is 
more complex, morally speaking, than the law as written, and a lawyer is free 
to convey these additional subtleties to the clients in the form of moral 
counseling.  Nevertheless, the presence of nuance and complexity in the 
world does not undercut the conclusion that the distinctive aspect of the role 
of lawyer—as opposed to others who dispense advice about morally complex 
 
question the capacity of official institutions to recognize rights in favor of disempowered citizens 
against the powerful.  My critics here are fond of ascribing various anxieties to me, so I will admit 
to worrying that treating the law instrumentally will result in a long-term impairment of its capacity 
to underwrite demands for respect by the powerless. 
44. Pepper, supra note 2, at 693. 
45. Id. at 693–94. 
46. Simon, supra note 2, at 714. 
47. The actual bit of dialogue, for those who are not children of the 70s and 80s, is: 
Dr. Rumack: I won’t deceive you, Mr. Striker.  We’re running out of time. 
Ted Striker: Surely there must be something you can do. 
Dr. Rumack: I’m doing everything I can, and stop calling me Shirley! 
AIRPLANE! (Paramount Pictures 1980). 
48. Pepper, supra note 2, at 694. 
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subjects—is that lawyers are responsible for ensuring that their advice 
conforms to the duties and permissions contained in the law.  The “abstract 
and wooden”49 tone of the advice given by the lawyer in Pepper’s 
hypothetical is the result of Pepper imagining an officious, self-righteous 
lawyer expressing disapproval of the client’s predicament.  I have no prob-
lem whatsoever with lawyers conveying a sense that the law is misguided, 
out of touch with reality, or perverse, but these judgments by the lawyer do 
not give the lawyer license to counsel the client—even indirectly, with a 
wink and a nod—to ignore the law.  If the client chooses to take the risk of 
violating the law, as long as the lawyer has not blessed or encouraged this 
conduct, the legal and moral blame rests with the client.50 
I also worry a bit that labeling some laws as anachronistic, foolish, or 
otherwise undeserving of respect reflects a certain elite condescension 
toward normative positions with which we (the “royal we”) disagree.  
Personally, I think it is idiotic that there is a criminal statute prohibiting 
unmarried adults from having consensual sex, but evidently, a substantial 
number of my fellow citizens believe that the existing antifornication statutes 
have got the balance just right.51  I have to recognize that my reaction to this 
statute reflects other beliefs I have concerning sexual morality and the 
appropriate scope of the criminal law that may not be universally shared, and 
that the law is not so crazy that no rational human being could ever endorse 
it.  Although none of the reviewers here has misinterpreted my view as moral 
relativism of the kind familiar to anyone who has taught an introductory 
ethics class, I want to be clear and say that I believe it is really correct to say 
that there is nothing morally wrong with premarital sex, and even if there 
were, it would not be appropriate to criminalize it.  Nevertheless, I 
acknowledge that others have deliberated conscientiously about this question 
and have reached the contrary conclusion. 
V. Conclusion: My Nightmares and Noble Dreams 
Luban and Kruse allude to Hart’s opposition between the nightmare of 
unlimited judicial discretion and the noble dream of a profession (in Hart’s 
case, the judiciary; as Luban suggests, lawyers in their capacity as legal 
 
49. Id. at 695. 
50. A lawyer who takes this stance is not a “legal cipher,” as Pepper suggests.  Id. at 700.  In 
my view, the propriety of moral counseling within the attorney–client relationship is an entirely 
contingent matter.  Some clients, as a result of a long-term professional relationship characterized 
by trust and mutual respect, might appreciate a lawyer telling them that it would be morally 
wrongful to plead the statute of limitations to escape a legal obligation.  Pepper is also right to note 
that a particular client may have business reasons for doing the decent thing notwithstanding a legal 
entitlement to the contrary.  Id. at 701 & n.48.  In these cases, moral counseling would be 
appropriate—maybe even expected by the client—but it is not a requirement of the role as such. 
51. If there is truly no remaining support for the law, it may be invalid under the doctrine of 
desuetude.  I am assuming here that the statute has been challenged on these grounds and has not 
been invalidated for that reason. 
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advisors) dedicated to a craft that contributes to social stability and 
solidarity.52  As this metaphor shows, a theory of law or legal ethics may be 
animated by a fear that a different approach is the road to some imagined 
hell.  The major figures in the field of legal ethics—many of whom I am 
honored to have as critics in this Colloquy—seem, ironically, to be worried 
about an excessive tendency on the part of citizens and lawyers to obey the 
law.  Simon exalts civil disobedience and even nullification of law,53 Luban 
reminds us that the Milgram Experiments demonstrated that people are not 
particularly inclined to resist unjust authorities,54 and even Pepper and 
Freedman—who have resolutely defended the standard conception against its 
academic critics for many years—have been concerned to provide avenues 
for conscientious objection by lawyers.55  The nightmare case in the back of 
the minds of these theorists is the German legal profession in the Third Reich 
or the American legal profession in the Jim Crow South, all too willing to 
lend their assistance and expertise to the administration of an unjust regime 
by faithfully interpreting and applying positive law.  The figure of the 
lawyer-as-Eichmann haunts many legal ethicists.  Their noble dreams, on the 
other hand, invoke real lawyers like Louis Brandeis or fictional characters 
such as Atticus Finch to highlight the virtues of wisdom, discretion, and 
informed judgment about both morality and the law.56  Not surprisingly, 
these lawyers tend to be nonconformists and mavericks, willing to disobey 
orders or blow the whistle if they believe the client’s ends are unjust.57 
  
 
52. DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 131–32 (2007); Kruse, supra note 3, 
at 670–71.  Nicola Lacey has taken this phrase as the subtitle for her biography of Hart, suggesting 
that the great philosopher’s life was itself both of these things.  NICOLA LACEY, A LIFE OF H.L.A. 
HART: THE NIGHTMARE AND THE NOBLE DREAM (2004). 
53. In one of my favorite papers of his, Simon argues that portrayals of lawyers in popular 
culture tend to depict lawyers as praiseworthy to the extent they are willing to violate the law in 
service of higher moral principles.  William H. Simon, Moral Pluck: Legal Ethics in Popular 
Culture, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 421, 447 (2001). 
54. LUBAN, supra note 52, at 237–66. 
55. Pepper does so in the context of moral counseling.  Pepper, supra note 2, at 699–702.  
Freedman insists that lawyers must make a morally grounded choice to represent any given client 
and are fully morally accountable for those choices.  MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, 
UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS § 4.02, at 69–72 (4th ed. 2010). 
56. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 2, at 715–16 (citing HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 
312–18 (40th Anniversary ed. 1999) (noting that Atticus Finch agreed with the sheriff to conceal 
evidence of Boo Radley’s involvement in the death of Bob Ewell); SIMON, supra note 31, at 127–35 
(citing approvingly the ethics of Brandeis, who while a lawyer in private practice sought to dissuade 
powerful clients from engaging in antisocial projects). 
57. Cf. Alice Woolley & W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and Moral Character, 23 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 1065, 1067 (2010) (arguing, inter alia, that the types of lawyers picked out as 
admirable by many theories of legal ethics would actually be dysfunctional in institutional practice 
settings). 
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My nightmare is set in a world in which not all lawyers possess the 
rectitude and trustworthiness of Brandeis and Finch but are just as keen to act 
as moral free agents.  The fear is not really anarchy, as Simon believes,58 but 
the abuse of power.  The figure that haunts my dreams is that of John Yoo, 
presenting his “legal” advice with a straight face to the President, informing 
him that the law authorizes waterboarding, or of the in-house and retained 
lawyers for Enron who authorized the transactions that eventually toppled the 
company.  In my dreams the lawyers do not believe themselves to be acting 
wrongly; rather, they think they are respecting the ethical principle of zealous 
advocacy.  Never mind that they are counseling clients or structuring 
transactions, not acting as advocates—they believe themselves to be ethically 
permitted to rely on strained, distorted, and implausible (or, stated more 
positively, creative and aggressive) interpretations of law to advance their 
clients’ ends.  Even worse, they may believe themselves to be doing 
something morally praiseworthy because it is in the public interest.  John 
Yoo, for example, clearly sees himself as a hero and a patriot for doing 
whatever was necessary to protect the American people from terrorism.59 
My noble dream is not a lawyer of extraordinary wisdom and discretion 
but merely a regular person who balks at bending the law out of shape to 
permit her client to do something.  In a basically just society, lawyers 
perform a valuable function, but it is one different from that performed by 
members of the clergy, psychotherapists, writers, political leaders, activists, 
community organizers, and citizen protesters.  The role of lawyers is more 
technocratic but no less noble.  Bureaucrats like Eichmann can be the instru-
ments of monstrous evil, and the Third Reich could not have functioned 
without the willing assistance of people just doing their jobs.  But the rule of 
law can be a great good too, and it also cannot exist without people doing 
their jobs. 
Within a moderately decent society, the ethics of lawyers acting as 
lawyers has to be oriented toward the law, not morality or justice.  If lawyers 
wish to be activists or dissidents, they can be, but it is essential that they not 
confuse these very different social roles.  I am not blind to the injustices that 
remain in the United States, but the legal response to these injustices should 
not be individual acts of sabotage or nullification.  Lawyers can and should 
advocate for change, but as always, it should be zealous advocacy within the 
bounds of the law.60  One of the principal aims of this book was to restore the 
 
58. Simon, supra note 2, 709. 
59. See generally JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS (2006). 
60. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980) (“A lawyer should represent 
a client zealously within the bounds of the law.”).  The notion of zeal survives in the modern 
disciplinary rules only in a few comments.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 2 
(2009) (“As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the 
adversary system.”); id. R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (“A lawyer must also act with . . . zeal in advocacy upon the 
client’s behalf.”).  Nevertheless, the Model Code formulation has remained influential and is quoted 
tirelessly by lawyers as a concise summary of their ethical obligations. 
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last part of the lawyer’s mantra just stated to its proper place in legal ethics.  
Without the constitutive obligation of fidelity to law, lawyers are just 
sophists—offering nothing beyond the kind of half-baked moral advice that 
any decent client could supply for herself.  If there is something distinctive 
about our profession, it has to be a commitment to the value of legality and a 
corresponding obligation to respect the law. 
